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Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Factors*
DOUGLAS K. BARNEY
IU Southeast
AYCAN KARA
IU Southeast
ABSTRACT
In light of the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s August 2014
Accounting Standard Update on management Going Concern Statements,
research using financial ratios to predict bankruptcy is more relevant than
ever. Even though numerous research articles examine factors that predict
bankruptcy, few make the distinction between the factors that affect
Chapter 7 versus Chapter 11 bankruptcy. This work examines the factors
that affect these two bankruptcy types (7 and 11) using the Securities and
Exchange Commission data on 425 firms that filed for Chapter 7 or
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. We tested our data using t-test, ordinary least
squares (OLS), and logistic regression. Our results indicate that the asset
turnover ratio and going concern statement are significant predictors of
Chapter 7 versus Chapter 11 bankruptcy. We note the implications for
auditors, corporate management, corporate creditors and investors, and the
Financial Accounting Standards Board.
KEY WORDS Chapter 7 Bankruptcy; Chapter 11 Bankruptcy; Financial Ratios;
Going Concern Statement
Identifying factors reflective of corporate success or failure has been the subject of much
research and discussion for decades. The topic has taken on a renewed emphasis with the
U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board’s August 2014 pronouncement (FASB 2014)
requiring corporate management to address corporate continuity starting with reporting
periods ending after December 15, 2016. Numerous studies have compared bankrupt and
viable firms, developed predictive models of bankruptcy, and examined financial ratios that
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Douglas K. Barney, 4201 Grant
Line Rd., Hillside Hall 217M, New Albany, IN 47150.
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are predictive of bankruptcy. In previous bankruptcy studies, researchers have examined
Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcies as the same. They are not the same, however.
U.S. Federal bankruptcy law (U.S. Code Title 11) identifies six types of
bankruptcy. The two bankruptcy filing types most commonly associated with businesses
are Chapter 7 and Chapter 11. With a Chapter 7 filing, corporate management plans to
“close up shop.” Corporate assets are liquidated and distributions are made to creditors in
a liquidation plan; the business ends operations. With a Chapter 11 filing, corporate
management anticipates that the corporation has the ability to continue operating after a
financial reorganization of the corporation. The corporation will undergo a financial
reorganization but will continue operations during this reorganization period.
This article examines these two bankruptcy types (7 and 11) as two of three
(including viable corporations) possible outcomes. It identifies factors predictive of
Chapter 7 versus Chapter 11 bankruptcy using t-tests, correlations, OLS regression, and
logistic regression. The study also examines the predictive ability (ability to predict
Chapter 7 versus Chapter 11 bankruptcy) of the resulting OLS and logit models. In
addition, this study splits the bankrupt-firm set into more refined data sets: firms filing
for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and firms filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Because the
expected differences between Chapter 7 firms and Chapter 11 firms are finer than the
expected differences between bankrupt firms and viable firms, we hypothesize that this
study will identify fewer explanatory variables with less discriminatory power than do
traditional bankruptcy studies. In addition, we hypothesize that the predictive model will
have less explanatory power (lower R-square) than traditional bankruptcy-prediction
studies because of the similarity of Chapter 7 firms and Chapter 11 firms when compared
with viable firms. The results of this research will help auditors, corporate management,
corporate creditors and investors, and the FASB.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A plethora of research articles address bankruptcy prediction, starting with seminal works
such as Beaver’s 1966 ratio analysis and Altman’s development of a Z-score in 1968.
These previous works and the work conducted here are even more important in light of
the FASB’s August 2014 accounting standards update (ASU) on going concern
statements. This ASU requires corporate management to include in the financial
statements (annual and interim) a statement about continuity-indicated concerns,
beginning with reporting periods ending after December 15, 2016.
Business managers and financial analysts have long used accounting information
to make various decisions, including lending decisions. Practitioners used and recognized
financial ratios as effective indicators of financial well-being decades before
academicians systematically explored their usefulness. Articles about the value of
financial data for failure prediction existed in the first half of the 20th century (e.g.,
Merwin 1942). More recently, however, Beaver and Altman wrote seminal research
articles about using financial data for predictive purposes.
In a 1966 study, Beaver examined the usefulness of ratios as predictors of
corporate financial well-being. Beaver tested the usefulness of financial ratios with regard
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to a specific purpose: failure prediction. Beaver defined failure as the inability to make
scheduled debt payments. He adopted three criteria for selecting ratios: popularity, ratio
performance in previous studies, and ratios defined by cash flow. Popular ratios were
those commonly found in the practical literature. Because corporate management knew
that these ratios are common ones on which to judge corporate performance, Beaver
expected corporations to “window dress” these ratios, which would result in the reduced
utility of popular ratios. Beaver’s list of possible explanatory ratios numbered 30. He
grouped these ratios into six “common element” categories and compared common
element ratios by their ability to predict failure or non-failure. Beaver used the ratio in
each category that predicted with the least error to represent the group. Beaver’s model
included six ratios: cash flow to total debt, net income to total assets, debt to assets,
working capital to total assets, current ratio, and quick assets less current liabilities
(1966:78). He predicted that all the ratios would be greater for non-failed firms than for
failed firms, with the exception of debt to assets, which should be greater for failed firms.
Beaver used a univariate, dichotomous classification to test the predictive abilities
of the six ratios. He arrayed the ratios in ascending order and selected a cutoff point that
optimally classified the failed and non-failed firms. Stated another way, he selected a
value for the ratio that best divided the firms into failed and non-failed groups. The
optimal cutoff point minimized the misclassifications. Beaver calculated this optimal
cutoff point for each of the six ratios; he did this 30 times: for each of the six ratios in
each of the five years.
Overall, Beaver’s ratios were quite predictive of failure. Cash flow to total debt
was most accurate at 87 percent one year before failure. This declined to 78 percent five
years before failure. Beaver noted that this level of accuracy is still much better than
random prediction (50 percent). The order of accuracy (descending) of other factors was
return on assets, debt to assets, working capital to total assets, and current ratio. Beaver
tested for but did not find any conclusive evidence that either industry or asset size had
any significant predictive ability.
Altman developed his Z-score in 1968 as a bankruptcy-prediction model.
Although researchers before Altman examined bankruptcy and provided evidence of
financial predictability of bankruptcy, Altman’s work is often cited as the seminal work
using statistical methods to evaluate and predict bankruptcy. Numerous researchers have
since refined his model and developed specialized bankruptcy-prediction models. Altman
examined 66 bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms using a multiple discriminant analysis
(MDA) method. Whereas Beaver examined the predictive ability of the ratios one at a
time, MDA provided Altman the opportunity to examine the predictive power of the
ratios in unison.
Altman’s sample included 33 failed and 33 non-failed firms. The bankrupt firms
filed for bankruptcy between January 1946 and December 1965. Non-failed firms were
those still in existence in 1966. Altman’s group of non-failed firms “consisted of a paired
sample of manufacturing firms chosen on a stratified random basis. The firms are
stratified by industry and by size, with the asset size range restricted to between $1–$25
million” (Altman 1968:594).
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Altman’s variable selection began with an exposition of the 22 ratios reported to
be significant in previous studies and several that Altman cited as possibly useful in his
study. He grouped these ratios into five commonly used categories of “liquidity,
profitability, leverage, solvency, and activity” (1968: 594). Altman’s final selection of
five variables from among the 22 resulted from a four-step process: (1) determination of
the contributions made by each variable independently, (2) examination of
intercorrelations, (3) consideration of accuracy of various combinations of variables, and
(4) “judgment of the analyst.” Altman performed many computer runs using different
linear combinations of ratio profiles (combinations of ratios) and found that earnings
before interest and taxes/total assets, market value equity/book value of total debt, and
sales/total assets were most significant.
Altman used three methods to test the results of his analysis. First, he used an Ftest. The model should divide the total sample into two groups—failed and successful
firms—maximizing the distance between the means of the two groups and minimizing
the variance of observations within each group. The F-test is a measure of how well the
resulting model achieves this objective. Altman’s F-score was significant at the .01 level.
In a second test of the model, Altman calculated the misclassifications of sample
individual observations from data one year before failure. He multiplied individual data from
sample firms by model coefficients to produce a Z-score. (The Z-score measures
standardized deviation from the mean.) Altman classified the firms by comparing each firm’s
Z-score with a benchmark Z-score. The accuracy in this test was quite high at 95 percent.
Altman further analyzed predictive ability three to five years prior to failure. His
results indicated that predictive accuracy falls considerably after the second year before
failure. In fact, predictive accuracy dropped to 48 percent, 29 percent, and 36 percent for
the third, fourth, and fifth years before failure, respectively.
Ohlson (1980) used the logit model to analyze factors related to business failure:
size and measures of financial structure, performance, and current liquidity. Ohlson
matched failed and non-failed firms of similar size and industry, although uncertain what
advantage matching provides. In fact, Ohlson found it more useful to use these factors as
input variables rather than as selection variables. Ohlson collected data from industrial
firms’ balance sheets, income statements, funds statements, and accountants’ reports for
the three years before the firms’ failures. His listing of failed firms began with the Wall
Street Journal Index. Size, debt to assets, return on assets, cash from operations/total debt,
a dichotomous variable representing net loss (0/1), and a dichotomous variable
representing negative solvency (0/1) were significant predictors of failure. The current
study uses all these variables as input factors.
Zavgren (1985) cited seven categories theoretically related to firm failure or nonfailure: return on investment, capital turnover, inventory turnover, financial leverage,
receivables turnover, short-term liquidity, and cash position. Zavgren found that each of
the variables tested showed some degree of significance in explaining failure, although
cash position and short-term liquidity were most significant in the short term. Return on
investment was the least significant of the explanatory variables.
Zmijewski (1984) identified two methodological problems with failure-prediction
studies. These are the data-collection problems of choice-based sample biases and sample
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selection biases. Choice-based sample biases result when researchers select observations
based on the dependent variable. Many researchers do this when one form of the
dependent variable (i.e., failure) seldom occurs in the population sampled. Researchers
use sample data sets with 50 percent failures and 50 percent successes even when failures
in the population are less than 2 percent of observations. The study reported here includes
all Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 firms in the time period studied for which data were
available. Deleting observations with missing data may cause sample selection bias, if
missing data is correlated with the dependent variable. Zmijewski’s results “do not
indicate significant changes in overall classification and prediction rates, nor do they
indicate different qualitative results (statistical inferences) for the financial distress model
tested” (Zmijewski 1984:63). Neither of the issues that Zmijewski addressed are problems
for the logistic regression method used in this study.
In their 1999 study, Barney, Graves, and Johnson examined the predictive ability
of 14 ratios on the ability of borrowers to make scheduled debt payments. The factors for
the prediction model included twelve financial factors and two dichotomous variables
representing previous debt trouble. The researchers examined ratios in the categories of
liquidity (e.g., current ratio), solvency (e.g., asset turnover), profitability (e.g., return on
assets), repayment capacity (e.g., cash debt coverage), and financial efficiency (e.g., asset
turnover). The researchers found that nine ratios were correlated (p < .10) with making
scheduled debt payments and that six of those nine ratios were highly correlated (p < .01)
with making scheduled debt payments.
Researchers have addressed the importance of differentiating Type I and Type II
errors. Type I error, as applied to bankruptcy studies, is the error of predicting bankruptcy
for a successful firm. Type II error, generally considered the more costly of the two, is
the error of identifying as successful a firm that subsequently files for bankruptcy.
Because this study does not include a study of successful firms, only bankrupt firms,
Type I error would be the prediction that a Chapter 11 firm files for Chapter 7. Type II
error would be the error of predicting that a Chapter 7 firm filed for Chapter 11. Although
this study does not address Type I and Type II errors, it is interesting to note that such
errors still apply.
We anticipate that, when compared with traditional bankruptcy studies comparing
bankrupt and viable firms, this study will identify fewer discriminatory factors of less
significance in weaker predictive models. Still, identifying significant Chapter 7 versus
Chapter 11 discriminatory factors will contribute to the relevant literature.
GOING CONCERN
U.S. (and international) auditing standards require auditors to provide a going concern
qualification with the audit report if auditors have doubts about a corporation’s ability to
continue functioning in its current form for the coming year. In other words, if the
auditors expect the corporation to go out of business (Chapter 7) or undergo restructuring
through bankruptcy proceedings (Chapter 11), the auditors should render a going concern
opinion in their audit letter. The time frame for the auditors’ going concern decision is
one year from the date of the financial statement.
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Prior to the passage of Sarbanes–Oxley Act, auditors—theoretically, at least—
were more reluctant to issue going concern opinions. Issuance of such opinions could
cost an auditor not only the auditing business of a particular client but also the much
more lucrative consulting business. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act theoretically reduced (but
did not eliminate) the conflict inherent in the auditor’s decision. According to section 201
of the act, auditors may not also engage in certain other work (notably some forms of
consulting) with their publicly traded audit clients.
METHODOLOGY
This study examined two sets of corporations: those that filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy
and those that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy as reported by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). The data were analyzed using correlation analysis, t-test of means,
OLS, and logistic regression.
Variables
This study uses the variables identified conceptually by the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB), which were used in previous bankruptcy-prediction studies
and are publicly available. According to the PCAOB, the auditors, when examining a
client for possible bankruptcy, should consider “recurring operating losses, working
capital deficiencies, negative cash flows from operating activities, [and] adverse key
financial ratios” (PCAOB 1989). While the PCAOB statement on appropriate factors to
consider is more recent than the works cited in the literature review, those seminal works
are still relevant today and provide the foundation for variable selection in current
bankruptcy studies. As expected, the PCAOB recommendations emulate factor selection
from those previous studies. Table 1 lists the factors used in this study.
It is anticipated that Chapter 11 firms will be in stronger financial positions than
will Chapter 7 firms, albeit in weaker financial positions than will be viable firms;
therefore, it is anticipated that all input factors except going concern and debt to assets
will be higher on average for Chapter 11 firms than for Chapter 7 firms.
Data
The SEC lists financial (and other) data for all publicly traded companies. New Generation
Research provides selected financial data for companies filing for bankruptcy. Data fields for
the New Generation Research data list whether corporations filed for Chapter 7 or Chapter 11
bankruptcy, as well as dates of filing. SEC filings (Forms 10-K and 10-Q) include all the
financial data and auditors’ letters needed for this study. The data collected for each
corporation were from the last financial statements submitted to the SEC on form 10-K
immediately prior to the bankruptcy filing date, but not more than two years prior to the
bankruptcy filing date. The data set includes all publicly traded companies filing for
bankruptcy from January 1, 2009, to February 1, 2013. Of the original 500 publicly traded
firms filing for bankruptcy during this period, 75 did not provide a 10-K to the SEC for the
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two years prior to their bankruptcy filing dates. This study includes the remaining 425 firms,
which consist of 75 U.S. firms that filed for Chapter 7 bakruptcy and 350 that filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Following are a few idiosyncratic financial facts about these
companies from the final 10-K before the bankruptcy filings.
Largest sales
Greatest Loss
Greatest Profit
Most Assets
Most Debt
Greatest Retained Earnings
Greatest Retained Deficit

Lyondell Chemical
Nortel Networks
Idearc
CIT Group
CIT Group
Eastman Kodak
Nortel Networks

Chemical
Telephone
Advertising
Finance
Finance
Photographic
Telephone

$22,674,000,000
$5,799,000,000
$183,000,000
$80,448,900,000
$72,279,800,000
$4,071,000,000
$42,362,000,000

Table 1. Factors Included in This Study
Liquidity
CR
CCDC
Activity
ARTO

current ratio = current assets / current liabilities
current cash debt coverage = cash from operations / current
liabilities
accounts receivable turnover = net sales / average trade
receivables
inventory turnover = cost of goods sold / average inventory
asset turnover = net sales / average total assets

INTTO
ATO
Profitability
PM
profit margin = net income / sales
ROA
return on assets = net income / total assets
CFOA
cash flows on assets = cash from operations / total assets
Coverage
DA
debt to assets = total debt / total assets
CDC
cash debt coverage = cash from operations / total debt
Financial History
PP
past performance = retained earnings / total assets
RE01
retained earnings / deficit (0 = deficit, 1 = no deficit)
PNI01
previous year income (0 = NOL, 1 = NI)
Other Factors
Total Assets at year end, stated in hundreds of millions of dollars
GCAR
auditor report (0 = unqualified, 1 = going concern)
Dependent Variable Bankruptcy (0 = Chapter 7, 1 = Chapter 11)
Note: NI=net income; NOL=net operating loss.
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Of the 425 firms, 252 received going concern statements from auditors, although
the period examined was a two-year window and auditors are required to consider only a
one-year window.
Table 2 provides summary averages of all ratios. Not all ratios (e.g., inventory
turnover) are applicable to all firms and were therefore not used in the calculation.
Table 2. Summary of Data Characteristics
Factor

N

CR
CCDC
ARTO
INTTO
ATO
PM
ROA
CFOA
DA
CDC
PP

418
420
337
193
393
395
423
423
423
425
423

RE01
PNI01
Total Assets
GCAR
Bankruptcy

425
425
425
425
425

Mean
2.02
0.21
22.97
23.63
0.91
–12.23
–6.23
–1.67
2.63
–0.17
–138.10

Median
0.68
–0.06
8.71
6.24
0.66
–0.34
–0.22
–0.22
0.96
–0.02
–0.78

15% of firms had positive retained earnings
24% of firms had a prior year net income instead of loss
16.62 (in hundreds of $millions)
59% of firms received going concern statements
83% filed Chapter 11; 17% filed Chapter 7

Financial ratios for firms undergoing financial stress can be quite different from
ratios for viable firms. Financial stress may significantly affect the current ratio, for
example. Of 418 observations, only 155 firms had current ratios above 1. Fifty-six (56)
firms had current ratios less than 0.1. Of 420 observations, 245 firms reported negative
current cash debt coverage, due to negative cash from operations. Similarly, 246 of 423
observations for cash flow on assets were negative. Most of these observations (200)
were between 0 and –1. Accounts receivable turnover varied dramatically. Firms with
minimal sales and accounts receivable balances had account receivable turnover near 0;
one hundred ninety-two (192) firms had accounts receivable turnover less than 1. Firms
nearing bankruptcy or contemplating bankruptcy may let inventory levels approach zero,
even if they are retailers, resulting in large inventory turnover ratios. One-third of the 193
observations for inventory turnover were ratios in excess of 10.
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Asset turnover ratio may be a strong indicator of financial distress. Asset turnover
and profit margin were missing 30 observations because 30 firms had no sales. With the
firms having no sales for the last 10-K before filing bankruptcy, one might expect that
most or all of these firms would file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Actually, however, only
12 of these 30 firms (40 percent) filed Chapter 7. The other 18 (60 percent) firms without
sales filed for Chapter 11, in anticipation of continuing operations. Of the 393
observations for asset turnover, 144 exceeded 1, and 50 exceeded 2.
The highest return on assets was 2.67. Four firms had return on assets greater than
1, and only 40 firms had a positive return on assets. Financially distressed firms do not
make efficient use their assets. Too much debt gets firms into trouble, from which they
cannot recover. Of 423 observations for debt to assets, 244 had debt-to-asset ratios less
than 1, but 75 of these had debt-to-asset ratios between .9 and 1.0. Having a respectable
debt-to-asset ratio did not guarantee that a firm would avoid bankruptcy. Seventy-nine
(79) bankrupt firms had debt-to-asset ratios of less than .4 in the last 10-K filed before
filing for bankruptcy. These firms often had at least two consecutive loss years.
A retained deficit was common among the firms. Of 423 observations, 358 had
retained deficits. Of 395 reporting firms, 40 (10 percent) had positive net income in the
last 10-K before filing bankruptcy. This compares with 24 percent filing positive net
income the previous year. Apparently, some firms that had the potential to continue
without bankruptcy were pushed over the edge by one (or more) bad years.
Data Analysis and Results
To test our hypotheses, we have used several quantitative methods.
t-Test. The Pearson two-tailed correlation shows the level of correlation between
the two examined variables, the direction of the correlation, and the significance of the
relationship. The t-test, with assumed unequal variances, examines for significance the
differences in means for each variable between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 firms.
Results, displayed in Table 3, indicate that Chapter 11 firms look stronger than
the Chapter 7 firms, and means are in the anticipated direction. Both sets of firms,
especially the Chapter 11 firms, have respectable current ratio averages. While the
current cash debt coverage ratio is negative for Chapter 7 firms, this ratio is positive for
Chapter 11 firms, with a significant difference. Both sets of firms have very large
accounts-receivable and inventory-turnover ratios immediately prior to filing for
bankruptcy. The financial statements show that firms tend to have low levels of inventory
and accounts receivable compared with what might be expected in their industries. Asset
turnover varied significantly between the two sets of firms, and for neither set did this
ratio average breach 1. Profit margin averaged negative for both sets of firms and did not
differ significantly between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 firms.
Return on assets and cash flows on assets were, on average, negative for both
Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 firms. Debt to assets was at distressing levels for both
Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 firms. With debt-to-asset ratios of 3.21 and 2.51 for Chapter
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7 and Chapter 11 firms, respectively, it is not surprising that these firms are applying
for bankruptcy.
Cash debt coverage varied significantly between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 firms
but averaged negative for both. Financial history of the firm (in the form of past
performance, retained-earnings dichotomous variable, or previous-year income) did not
vary significantly between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 firms. Assets were significantly
larger for Chapter 11 firms than for Chapter 7 firms. This may be due to Chapter 11 firms
being larger initially than Chapter 7 firms or, as was seen in numerous cases, due to
Chapter 7 firms selling off assets in efforts to save the businesses. Chapter 7 firms were
significantly more likely to receive going concern statements from auditors than were
Chapter 11 firms, with 76 percent of Chapter 7 firms receiving going concern statements
and 56 percent of Chapter 11 firms receiving going concern statements.
Table 3. t-test Results for Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 Bankruptcies
Factor

Chapter 7
Mean
1.21
–1.34
33.47
27.60
.69
–25.97
–28.57
–7.46
3.21
–.68
–751.31
.14
.219
6.14
.76

CR
CCDC
ARTO
INTTO
ATO
PM
ROA
CFOA
DA
CDC
PP
RE01
PNI01
Assets
GCAR
**p < .01

Chapter 11
Mean
2.20
.53
21.51
23.24
.96
–9.74
–1.47
–.56
2.51
–.06
–9.91
.16
.25
18.83
.56

t-value
–.92
–1.68+
.50
.23
–1.73+
–1.66
–1.00
–1.03
1.00
–1.83+
–1.01
–.43
–.57
–2.94**
3.49**

p < .10

+

Although none of the correlations (Table 4) were greater than .2, this was
expected, as it is difficult to discriminate between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11
bankruptcies. Still, the results are impressive because they show that although difficult, it
is possible to identify some distinctions between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcy
filings using financial data.
All significant correlations were in the anticipated direction. Of the significant
correlations, asset turnover is the least correlated (.094) with type of bankruptcy, but the
correlation is significant (p < .10). As asset turnover increases,so does the likelihood that
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a firm will file for Chapter 11 versus Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Likewise, return on assets
and cash flow on assets positively correlated (p < .05) with bankruptcy type. Like asset
turnover, a better return on assets or cash flow on assets indicates greater likelihood that a
firm will plan to continue operations after bankruptcy proceedings.
Debt to assets is negatively correlated with bankruptcy type, as expected. As the
debt-to-asset ratio increases, a firm becomes more likely to select Chapter 7 bankruptcy
and cease operations.
Past performance of the firm is a significant (p < .05) correlate of the type of
bankruptcy filing, but the correlation is perhaps not as strong as anticipated. Current
performance, in contrast, did not provide a significant relationship. Going concern
explanation by the external auditors was the most significant (p < .01) predictor of
bankruptcy filing and provided the most explanatory power. The negative correlation
indicates that a firm filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy is more likely to receive a going
concern explanation in its auditor letter. This is rational, as firms filing Chapter 7 a priori
would have worse ratios and would therefore garner more auditor attention.
Table 4. Correlations of Factors Used
Factor
CR
CCDC
ARTO
INTTO
ATO
PM
ROA
CFOA
DA
CDC
PP
RE01
PNI01
Assets
GCAR
p < .10

+

Correlation with
Bankruptcy Type
.02
.04
–.06
–.01
.10+
.08
.11*
.11*
–.11*
.05
.11*
.02
.03
.08
–.15**
*p < .05 **p < .01

***p < .001

Ordinary Least Square Regression. We used the OLS model (Aldrich and Nelson
1984:10) to predict the factors affecting Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings. The
objective of the OLS model is to select coefficients (bk) to minimize the sum of the
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squared differences between the observed outcomes and the predicted outcomes. The
OLS model is
Yi = ΣbkXik + ui

where bk is a vector of unknown coefficients, X is the observed independent variable, and
u is the error term. In this context (Yi is either 0 or 1), the model is a “linear probability
model.” The observed outcomes are either 0 or 1: Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Because the methodology does not place bounds on the predicted outcomes, the resulting
OLS model may yield probabilities greater than 1 or less than 0. The logit model, which
we will discuss next, theoretically improves on OLS by restricting the predicted
probabilities from 0 to 1.
We ran two different OLS models (Table 5). First, using all the input variables
above, we identified two variables as significant components in the model: asset turnover
and going concern. Model 1 provided an adjusted R-square of .037 (p < .10). Although
the model was significant at predicting bankruptcy type, the overall model did not have
much explanatory power. This result is consistent throughout the statistical methods used
above and was anticipated.
Table 5. OLS Results
Dependent Variable:
Bankruptcy Type
Independent Variables
CR
CCDC
ARTO
INTTO
ATO
PM
ROA
CFOA
DA
CDC
PP
RE
PNI
Assets
GC
p < .10

+

*p < .05

Model 1
B
t
–.08
–1.08
.03
.34
–.10
–1.48
–.01
–.19
–.13 –1.88+
.07
.93
–.05
–.32
–.04
–.33
–.04
–.28
.11
1.27
.18
1.61
.07
.98
–.01
–.08
.05
.77
–.13 –1.66+
**p < .01

Model 2
B
t
–.05
–.69
.08
1.01
–.09
–1.38
–.02
–.29
–.13 –1.89+
.05
.68
–.06
–.15
–.004
–.04
.19
.48
.10
1.19
.31
1.94+
.10
1.40
.01
.08
.05
.80

***p < .001
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Because the auditors develop the going concern audit report after examining the
other financial factors, it is useful to examine the significance of other factors without
going concern audit report as an input factor; we therefore ran a second OLS model
without going concern (Model 2). The removal of the going concern audit report resulted
in the significance of past performance as an input factor. The overall fit of the model,
however, dropped to an adjusted R-square of .035 (with a significance of .293), which
means the model has no explanatory power without going concern audit report.
Logistic Regression. Researchers cite the advantages of logistic regression models
in studies with dichotomous dependent variables because logistics regression does not
assume linearity between the dependent and independent variables (Stone and Rasp
1997). Accounting researcher studies show that OLS can perform as well as logistic
regression (Gessner et al. 1988). OLS assumes that the relationship between the
dependent and independent variables is linear. OLS also identifies the regression line
fitting the data as the line that minimizes the sum of the squares of the errors of the
predictions from the observations.
On the other hand, researchers use logit in many dichotomous output models,
including failure-prediction models. Stone and Rasp (1997) noted a preference for logit
over OLS in accounting-choice studies, even in studies using small sample sizes. Articles
in the accounting research literature provide results of comparisons of OLS and logistic
regression (logit and probit).
Noreen (1988) compared probit and OLS using samples of 50 and 100
observations—sizes he describes as average for accounting classification studies—with
several ratios and at least one dummy variable as independent variables. Stone and Rasp
identified and researched the tradeoffs between OLS and logit, stating that researchers
can expect logit “to be more powerful whenever the relationship being modeled is
nonlinear” (1997:184).
The logit model assumes a logistic relationship between the inputs and output.
This model is
P(Y = 1│X) = exp(ΣbkXk) / [1 + exp(ΣbkXk)]

where b represents the coefficient estimates of the model and X represents the observed
values (Aldrich and Nelson 1984).
The objective of logistic regression is to select coefficients (bk) that maximize the
likelihood of predicting the observed outcome (0/1). Maximum likelihood estimation
seeks to maximize the logit likelihood function (Aldrich and Nelson 1984):
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The logit model provides probabilities of success or failure but, unlike the OLS model,
limits the output from 0 to 1.
We ran stepwise logistic regression using input variables in a forward integration
logit model with .09/.10 probabilities and 411 observations. The results of the analysis,
shown in Table 6, indicate that the model had a Cox and Snell R-square of .057.
Table 6. Results of Logistic Regression

Step 1
Step 2
Step 3

GC
Constant
ATO
GC
Constant
ATO
PP
GC
Constant

B

SE (B)

Wald

Sig.

OR

–1.39
3.18
–0.36
–1.55
3.77
–0.38
0.02
–1.37
3.83

.57
.51
.19
.59
.63
.19
.01
.61
.64

5.84
38.78
3.67
6.92
35.83
4.15
2.61
5.08
36.16

< .05
< .001
< .10
< .01
< .001
< .05
.11
< .05
< .001

.25
24.00
.70
.22
43.42
68
1.02
.25
46.26

The above models show that going concern audit report is the strongest
determinant of bankruptcy type. This is logical, given that the auditors will incorporate
the other factor information (e.g., debt to assets, return on assets, past performance) in
their going concern audit report decisions. Because the auditors develop the going
concern audit report after examining the other financial factors, it is useful to examine the
significance of other factors without going concern audit report as an input factor.
Table 7. Logit Stepwise Regression without GCAR
Variable
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3

p < .10

+

CCDC
CCDC
ATO
CCDC
ATO
RE
*p < .05

Model Log
Likelihood
–71.95
–71.02
–69.97
–67.84
–67.45
–68.44
**p < .01

Change in –2
Log Likelihood
4.04*
5.60*
3.51+
4.59*
3.81+
5.78*
***p < .001
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Without going concern audit report, logit included three factors in the model:
current cash debt coverage, asset turnover, and retained earnings (dichotomous variable).
The model without going concern audit report had a Cox and Snell R-square of .055. As
the results shows (Table 7), results were slightly different once we removed going
concern from our model.
Table 8 outlines the factors determined with each method to have a significant
relationship with bankruptcy type.
Table 8. Summary of Findings
Factor
CR
CCDC
ARTO
INTTO
ATO
PM
ROA
CFOA
DA
CDC
PP
RE01
PNI01
Assets
GCAR

ttest

OLS
OLS
Logit
Logit
Correlation with without with without
GCAR GCAR GCAR GCAR

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X

Asset turnover was a significant factor in every statistical method differentiating
Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 firms. Apparently, efficiency of operations focusing on use of
assets is a strong determining factor in planned corporate continuity. The going concern
audit report was also a significant determining factor in all statistical methods in which it
was available. This is not surprising, as the auditors have access to all the data analyzed
here, and more.
Past performance in the form of retained earnings over assets was identified three
times as significant. The three factors directly involving current assets—current ratio,
accounts receivable turnover, and inventory turnover—did not differ between Chapter 7
and Chapter 11 firms and were not significant determining factors in any statistical
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method. Firms nearing a bankruptcy decision see dramatic changes to their current-asset
and current-liability positions. This may well cloud the picture for these firms.
Profit margin in the current year and whether the firm was profitable the prior
year did not differ significantly between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 firms, nor were these
two factors identified in any statistical model as significant input factors. It is possible
that the question of whether to file for Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 hinges more on the
longer-term perspective than recent operations of results, based on the lack of
significance of the ratios using current assets and current liabilities and the ratios of
current and past-year profit performance.
CONCLUSION
Previous research has identified key factors separating bankrupt corporations from viable
corporations, but this work has taken the previous research one step further, by
differentiating between corporate bankruptcy types and examining factors explanatory of
bankruptcy type (Chapter 7 or Chapter 11). Both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcy
filings are indicators that firms have serious financial trouble. Although, based on prior
studies, there is a distinct financial contrast between viable firms and firms filing for
bankruptcy, the financial contrast between firms filing for Chapter 7 versus Chapter 11
bankruptcy is not as distinct. Still, there are significant financial differences between
firms filing for the two types of bankruptcy. This study identified and discussed some of
those financial differences, and the results of this research will help auditors, corporate
management, corporate creditors and investors, and the FASB.
Corporate management and public auditors must make going-concern decisions
about corporations’ abilities to remain in business for the coming year. A model
differentiating Chapter 7, Chapter 11, and viable firms can help corporate management
make a decision or can help reinforce a decision already made. The model can also serve
as an additional warning of impending bankruptcy. Such a warning can provide an
impetus for management to make needed changes in time to save the corporation.
The FASB may well be the greatest beneficiary of this research. The FASB has
issued an ASU requiring corporate management to render going concern letters. Such
required letters could have more than one form of wording; they could include phrasing
to indicate that the corporation plans to liquidate (Chapter 7) versus undertake financial
restructuring (Chapter 11). Corporate management would therefore decide whether to
issue a going concern letter, and, if so, whether that letter incorporates Chapter 7 or
Chapter 11 wording.
Corporate creditors will also benefit from this research. Previous research has
examined bankrupt corporations versus viable corporations. Chapter 11 financial
reorganization changes the dynamics of creditor positions in the corporation yet may
allow creditors to maintain a financial position, as opposed to the Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
There is a similar benefit for investors. Chapter 7 bankruptcy means the cessation
of business and often means that investors receive little, if any, remuneration. Chapter 11
bankruptcy may provide the opportunity for investors to maintain some financial position
in the corporation, depending on the terms of reorganization.
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